Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg has directed the Pentagon to begin, within six months, an initial small-scale deployment of an automated security classification capability, according to a memorandum issued Monday and reviewed by DefenseScoop. The pilot will run on the Automated Classification Management Environment, or ACME, a suite of AI-aided tools the Air Force built to modernize how sensitive information is marked and managed, and the Air Force's top civilian official is named executive agent. A Department of the Air Force spokesperson said the service will comply with the memo.
The ambition in the memo is larger than a pilot. If the trial succeeds, the automated system is meant to become the single digital authoritative reference for all of the department's original classification decisions. That responsibility has historically sat with specially designated human officials, of whom there are hundreds, who decide how a given piece of information is categorized. An August request for information on ACME described the current process as manual and human-intensive, run on relatively archaic programs, and incompatible with the volume and speed of digital information, citing outdated documentation, high error rates, frequent over-classification and degraded data integrity.
The memo frames the existing classification and declassification procedures as a source of dysfunction that endangers the mission: incorrect classifications burden national security systems, impede interoperability, and trap data in stovepipes, while also slowing the release of information to the public. Automation is presented as the fix on both sides of that ledger, faster and more consistent marking for operational data sharing, and quicker declassification for transparency.
Several important details are not public. The Pentagon did not say which underlying models power ACME, how its outputs will be reviewed, how errors will be audited, or how the pilot's success will be measured. Those questions matter more here than in most deployments, because a classification decision is both a legal act and a security control: an over-classification error mostly costs efficiency, but an under-classification error can expose sensitive information, and either kind of error propagates into every downstream system that consumes the marking. The memo arrives as the department pushes AI into most of its operations and as public debate continues over incidents where AI systems slipped human oversight.
For practitioners, this is one of the clearest cases yet of a government handing a model a role that is formally reserved for accountable human officials, rather than using it as an advisory tool. How the pilot defines human review, and whether the single authoritative reference stores the model's rationale alongside each decision, will determine whether this becomes a template for other agencies.